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against Recurrent Neural Networks
Tatsuya Takemura, Naoto Yanai and Toru Fujiwara
Abstract—Model extraction attacks are a kind of attacks in
which an adversary obtains a new model, whose performance
is equivalent to that of a target model, via query access to the
target model efficiently, i.e., fewer datasets and computational
resources than those of the target model. Existing works have
dealt with only simple deep neural networks (DNNs), e.g., only
three layers, as targets of model extraction attacks, and hence
are not aware of the effectiveness of recurrent neural networks
(RNNs) in dealing with time-series data. In this work, we shed
light on the threats of model extraction attacks against RNNs. We
discuss whether a model with a higher accuracy can be extracted
with a simple RNN from a long short-term memory (LSTM),
which is a more complicated and powerful RNN. Specifically, we
tackle the following problems. First, in a case of a classification
problem, such as image recognition, extraction of an RNN model
without final outputs from an LSTM model is presented by
utilizing outputs halfway through the sequence. Next, in a case of
a regression problem. such as in weather forecasting, a new attack
by newly configuring a loss function is presented. We conduct
experiments on our model extraction attacks against an RNN and
an LSTM trained with publicly available academic datasets. We
then show that a model with a higher accuracy can be extracted
efficiently, especially through configuring a loss function and a
more complex architecture different from the target model.
Index Terms—Model Extraction Attacks, Deep Neural Net-
works, Recurrent Neural Networks, Long Short-Term Memory
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Backgrounds
Deep learning is a state-of-the-art technology for machine
learning and is known to provide various advantages in many
areas. Deep learning requires heavy computations, and thus a
business style called machine-learning-as-a-service (MLaaS),
where a machine learning model is hosted via a public server,
has received attention recently. Well-know MLaaS include
AWS1 and Microsoft Azure2. In such a situation where a
machine learning model consists of two tasks, i.e., training
and prediction, a trained model is stored in a public server,
e.g., cloud server, and a client requests the model to run a
prediction task via APIs.
However, the execution of prediction tasks via APIs may
leak information about a model to a client. Model extraction
attacks [1] have received attention in recent years from the
standpoint of information leakage described above. In par-
ticular, an adversary who behaves as a client trains his/her
Tatsuya Takemura, Naoto Yanai and Toru Fujiwara are with Graduate
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1https://aws.amazon.com/jp/aml/
2https://azure.microsoft.com/ja-jp/services/machine-learning-studio/
own model by utilizing APIs of a machine learning model
hosted by a public server, called an original model, and its
prediction results. The trained model by the adversary is called
a substitute model. The goal of the adversary is to obtain
a local copy of a machine learning model with a higher
accuracy even when the adversary owns less data than the
public server of the original model [2], [3]. In general, benefits
for the adversary are significant because gathering data and
its training are tasks with heavy costs. Moreover, according
to Juuti et al. [3], transferable adversarial examples [4] to
analyze misidentifiable predictions via a substitute model have
been discussed as applications of model extraction attacks.
Consequently, a model extraction attack is a serious problem
for deep learning and its underlying machine learning.
In spite of the significance of model extraction attacks, only
simple architectures such as a logistic regression model [1] or
deep neural networks (DNNs) with simple architectures [3],
[5] have been discussed in existing works. Thus, the features
and feasibility of model extraction attacks on other architec-
tures are unclear. For instance, threats of model extraction
attacks are non-trivial for recurrent neural networks (RNNs)
which are used in natural language processing and cyberse-
curity applications. In particular, the computational process of
deep learning differs according to the architecture, and thus
the success conditions and advantages of an adversary may
differ according to the architecture as well. Hence, discussion
on model extraction attacks for various architectures is an
important research theme to avoid many potential threats as
applications of the attacks, e.g., adversarial examples via a
substitute model as described above.
B. Contribution
In this paper, we introduce model extraction attacks against
RNNs and long-short term memory (LSTM) and show that
RNNs with a higher prediction accuracy as a substitute model,
i.e., by an adversary, can be obtained from LSTM as an
original model, i.e., by a public server. Our technical con-
tributions include finding attacks based on features of RNNs
and LSTMs for a classification task and a regression task.
Intuitively, substitute models with higher accuracies can be
obtained based on the features of RNNs and LSTMs, which
compute an output for each time and give feedbacks to the
next time as well as considering architectures of the models
and those loss functions to obtain final outputs (See Section IV
for the detais). Despite RNNs having simpler architectures
than LSTMs, an adversary can train a substitute model with
a high accuracy without final outputs from an original model
by biasing the outputs halfway through the sequence.
2We also conduct experiments with the MNIST dataset3 for
a classification task and with the Air Quality dataset4 for
a regression task to show the ability to extract RNNs as
substitute models from LSTMs as original models. Results
show that, for the MNIST dataset, the substitute model with
97.5% prediction accuracy can be extracted only with 20% of
training data in comparison to 97.3% accuracy of the original
model. For the Air Quality dataset, the substitute model with
87.2% accuracy, which is computed by the coefficient R2 of
determination, can be extracted only with training data for
three months in comparison with the original model which
achieves 89.9% accuracy with training data for ten months.
We also discuss relationships between architectures and those
features and shed light on the success factors for model
extraction and countermeasures (See Section V for details).
C. Related Work
State-of-the-Art Attacks: In one of the latest results, Reith
et al. [6] discussed model extraction against support vector
regression. For works targeting neural networks, Juuti et al. [3]
showed an attack in which an adversary generates queries for
DNNs with simple architectures. Their attack may improve
our results on RNNs, but we leave this as an open problem
for RNNs. Concurrently, Wang et al. [7] proposed model
extraction attacks to steal hyperparameters against a simple
architecture, e.g., a neural network with three layers. To the
best of our knowledge, the most elegant attack was shown
by Okada and Hasegawa [2]. They utilized distillation [8],
[9], which is a technique for model compression described
below, to execute model extraction attacks against DNNs and
convolution neural networks (CNNs) for image classification.
In doing so, Okada and Hasegawa succeeded in extracting
a model with a higher accuracy than the original model.
Therefore, we consider their work as having the best results
from the standpoint of the use of distillation.
Relationships between Architectures and Accuracy: One
of the main discussions in this paper is to clarify relationships
between accuracy and architectures on an original model and a
substitute model. Similar discussions have been done by Juuti
et al. [3], Pal et al. [10], Krishna et al. [11], and Okada et
al. [2]. The papers in [3], [10] explain that the accuracy of
the substitute model increases in general when the architecture
of an original model is identical to that of a substitute model.
Pal et al. [10] have claimed that their argument is true
unless underfitting or overfitting is caused on a substitute
model, whose architecture is more complicated than that of
the original model, e.g., the use of a deeper network in the
substitute model than in the original model. In contrast, the
results in [11] showed that, when BERT [12] utilized in natural
language processing is targeted, the accuracy of the substitute
model is improved by the use of a deeper BERT model as the
substitute model than the original model. The results in [2]
also showed a similar result in a case of DNNs and CNNs.
Our results are intuitively identical to the results in [11], [2],
except for the use of RNNs.
3http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist/
4https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/air+quality
Distillation: In additional related works, model compres-
sion, named distillation [8], is represented. Distillation is
used for reducing learning information by multiple neural
networks, which are named as teacher models, to smaller
neural networks, which are named student models. Hinton et
al. [9] showed a method to distillate a model by a softmax
function with temperature, which can control the convergence
of training through temperature. While distillation allows a
student model to extract a large amount of information from
a teacher model, model extraction attacks require that an
adversary have as little as possible access to a dataset and
an original.
Additional Features on Model Extraction: As one of
the latest features on model extraction attacks, the Knockoff
attack [13] discusses how an adversary tries a model extraction
attack based solely on observed input-output pairs, i.e., without
any knowledge of the dataset for an original model. However,
Atli et al. [14] showed that the performance of the Knockoff
attack is limited. Meanwhile, Jagielski et al. [15] proposed a
new feature named fidelity to measure the general agreement
between an original model and a substitute model. Discussions
on these features on RNNs remain an open problem.
Further Attacks to Encourage Model Extraction:
Naghibijouybari et al. [16] and Yoshida et al. [17] introduced
side-channel attacks targeting models separated by hardware
mechanisms. Model reverse-engineering attacks [18] where
an original model is operated in an environment owned by
an adversary have also been shown as advanced attacks.
These attacks are stronger than the attack scenario in this
work because we do not discuss such physical access to an
original model for an adversary. Our attack against RNNs
can potentially become stronger by utilizing the side-channel
attack described above.
D. Paper Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. First, the
background required for understanding this paper is presented
in Section II. Next, an attack model and the proposed attacks
against RNNs are presented in Section III. Then, experiments
are shown in Section IV, and considerations including po-
tential countermeasures are shown in Section V. Finally, the
conclusion and future directions are presented in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we provide the background to understanding
our work.
A. Tasks Specified in Neural Networks
A mechanism of a neural network varies depending on the
task to be solved and especially loss functions is completely
different for the task. Hence, it is necessary to discuss attack
techniques separately. We describe the two types of tasks
handled by neural networks below.
31) Classification: A classification task is a task where an
input is classified into one of the categories specified in
advance as an output of prediction. For example, a neural
network for classification categorizes a number from 0 to
9 when a handwritten digit is given as input. The number
of neurons in the neural network required to solve such a
classification task is identical with the number of candidates
in an output layer, and decides which neuron has the largest
calculation result. The training is often executed through a
softmax function to return the candidates with probabilities.
2) Regression: A regression task outputs continuous values
as a response to input. For example, a neural network for
the prediction of air quality outputs a numerical value of a
component of the air quality at a certain time of the given input
on the previous several hours. The neural network that solves
a regression task outputs a numerical value on an output layer.
Here, the neural network has plural neurons in proportion to
the number of candidates predicted on the output layer. Unlike
the classification task, values of neurons in the output layer
are computed without a softmax function.
B. Recurrent Neural Networks
1) Principle of Recurrent Neural Networks: Recurrent neu-
ral networks (RNNs) are a kind of neural network that deals
with time-series data including contexts, e.g., speech recogni-
tion and language processing. RNNs have negative feedbacks
in those networks. In comparison with the architectures of
typical neural networks, such as deep neural networks (DNNs),
RNNs have a similar input layer, hidden layer, and output
layer, but they also have a feedback path to return the output
of the hidden layer to the input itself.
We describe RNNs in detail below. An RNN takes an input
at each time. An input given at time t propagates from the
input layer to the hidden layer in a similar manner as in
conventional neural networks. An output of the hidden layer
with an activation function propagates to the output layer and,
in parallel, returns to the input of the hidden layer itself as
feedback. The signal propagated to the output layer is output
as a prediction result at time t, whereas the feedback is given
to the hidden layer as a part of an input at the next time t+1.
Consequently, the output at t+1 is affected by the outputs of
the hidden layer before time t, and hence, is able to capture
contexts of time-series data. Unlike typical neural networks
which approximate a mapping from a single input to a single
output, an RNN approximates a mapping from a sequence to
a sequence and returns outputs at every time. RNNs are used
in both classification and regression tasks. In particular, RNNs
often deal with a regression task to predict continuous values,
such as stock price prediction [19].
2) Long Short-Term Memory: In general, neural networks
with deeper layers have a gradient loss problem [20]. Since
RNNs have a recursive structure in a hidden layer, information
propagates deeper when input time-series data as input be-
comes longer, even for shallow networks. Consequently, RNNs
are prone to the gradient loss problem, i.e., memory is difficult
to keep for a long period. Long short-term memory (LSTM)
has been proposed to overcome the gradient loss problem of
RNNs, which only store memory for a short period. The basic
architecture of LSTMs is the same as that of RNNs, except that
a hidden layer with a recursive structure of RNNs is replaced
with a layer with an element called memory unit.
Compared to standard RNNs, LSTMs have larger computa-
tional complexity because they have more complicated archi-
tectures. Furthermore, LSTMs have different types depending
on the types of inputs and outputs. For instance, LSTMs have
the following three types. The many-to-many type has inputs
and outputs at each time. The many-to-one type has inputs
given at each time and a single output at only the last time.
The one-to-many type has a single input at only the first time
and an individual output at each time. Typical neural networks
have a single output for each given input, and hence, can be
considered as the one-to-one type.
C. Model Extraction Attacks
We briefly describe an overview of model extraction attacks
below. Suppose that a model stored in a public server is trained
using training data D1 ⊂ D. Hereafter, the trained model
is called the original model. General users pay the server to
utilize its hosting service and give data as input via APIs of
the server. This data is input to the original model, and then
the original model returns prediction results to a user as a
response from the service.
Based on this background, an adversary, who knows a part
of the training dataset D2 ⊂ D, executes the original model
through the API to train his/her own model by utilizing predic-
tion results from the original model for D2. The model trained
by the adversary is called substitute model. For example, the
adversary can train a substitute model by using prediction
results and computational resources of the original model as
a springboard to obtain the same or higher accuracy as that of
the original model. This is the intuition of an attack strategy
for model extraction attacks.
The main advantage of model extraction attacks for an
adversary is to obtain a model with significantly reduced costs
for both data collection and its resulting training. In general,
data collection and training tasks need heavy costs, and hence
resulting models become an important asset for a provider
of a public server hosting an original model. In contrast, the
adversary can obtain a substitute model whose performance
can be the same as the original model without paying such
expensive costs. Moreover, the state-of-the-art work in [2]
has shown that model extraction attacks enable an adversary to
obtain a substitute model with higher accuracy than an original
model.
III. MODEL EXTRACTION ATTACKS AGAINST RECURRENT
NEURAL NETWORKS
A. Problem Setting
We describe the technical problems and conditions for
model extraction attacks against RNNs as the main problem
setting below.
Computational Resources: An original model is provided
on a public server with a rich computational resource, whereas
4an adversary, who executes model extraction attacks, needs to
train a substitute model with less resources.
Input/Output: In contrast to deep neural networks (DNNs),
RNNs contain an input and an output for each time. These
inputs and outputs are utilized halfway through the sequences
in feedback to compute for a final output. We discuss how an
adversary obtains an advantage for model extraction attacks
from the inputs and outputs halfway through the sequences.
Regression: As described in Section II-B, RNNs are often
utilized for a regression task. Existing model extraction attacks
have been discussed mainly about classification tasks, such as
image classification. A softmax function is utilized in neural
networks for a classification task, but it cannot be used for a
regression task. Therefore, known techniques [2] that modify
the softmax function to decrease the number of queries cannot
be used. Moreover, since an adversary who owns several parts
of a dataset used in an original model may know the correct
result for each output in advance, the merit of the information
obtained from the APIs may downgrade in comparison with
the DNNs. To effectively utilize information from RNNs, a
loss function for a regression task should be constructed in
detail.
In this paper, we evaluate the accuracy of model extraction
attacks against RNNs from the standpoints described above.
B. Attack Strategy
In this section, we describe model extraction attacks based
on features of RNNs.
As described in the previous section, two features, i.e.,
computational resource and input/output, should be considered
for model extraction attacks against RNNs. First, the architec-
ture of an LTSM is more complicated than that of an RNN.
Hereafter, we simply denote RNNs with a simple architecture
as RNNs. Second, in comparison with other neural networks,
such as DNNs or convolutional neural networks (CNNs), an
output with variable length is generated for each time in RNNs.
Hence, we discuss model extraction attacks against RNNs
from the following standpoints:
1) Can a substitute model consisting of RNN be extracted
from an original model consisting of LSTM?
2) Can an adversary obtain any advantage by utilizing
features of input/output for RNNs?
We describe the details of the attacks below. Let training data
used in an original model be Dc and training data used in
a substitute model be Da. Here, the original model, i.e., an
LSTM, is trained by utilizingDc. Then, an adversary trains the
substitute model, i.e., an RNN, with Da, and then continues
to train RNN using the obtained prediction results from the
original model by giving input data.
1) Attack on Classification Task: In general, a neural net-
work that solves a classification task returns an output without
the use of a softmax function in its output layer for prediction.
We call such an output, i.e., values not obtained through a
softmax function, logits. While logits are soft-label encoding
where each label is output with a probability as a prediction
result, labeled data utilized in training an original model and
a substitute model, i.e., Dc and Da, are one-hot encoding that
Fig. 1. One-Hot Encoding and Soft-Label Encoding
represents just a true value for each label. The intuition of
soft-label encoding and one-hot encoding is shown in Fig. 1.
In this situation, an adversary executes the following attack
procedure:
1) Identification of Leaky Time for the Original Model:
The adversary identifies the maximized index on each
vector for logits returned from the original model from
the first time to the last time and then evaluates the
prediction accuracy for each time by comparing those
labels. A time with high accuracy is defined as a leaky
time.
2) Intensive Extraction at Leaky Time: For the leaky time
described in the previous item, the softmax function with
temperature [9] is utilized. In particular, the adversary
first trains a substitute model by computing a loss
function with labeled data, i.e., one-hot labels, included
in Da to update the parameters. Then, the adversary
computes the loss function, in which soft-labels through
the softmax function with temperature are set as labeled
data, to update the parameters.
The softmax function with temperature is defined in equa-
tion (1) and its output is shown in Fig. 2. Intuitively, the
behavior of this function is identical to the behavior of the
original softmax function when T = 1, and a gradient becomes
smaller in proportion to a temperature T , i.e., convergence of
training can become faster in proportion to T . In this paper,
the softmax function with temperature is utilized and, in doing
so, the effects on model extraction attacks are evaluated by
changing T .
softmax(k) =
e
a
k
T∑n
i=1 e
ai
T
. (1)
2) Attack on Regression Task: A neural network that solves
a regression task returns a predicted value computed by a
model, and the output is drastically different from a model for
a classification task whose output is labeled with probabilities.
Consequently, due to the structure of an output layer, a softmax
function cannot be used as a loss function. In general, norms
are utilized in a loss function for a model to solve a regression
task, e.g., L1loss or L2loss.
The softmax function with temperature and L2loss have
been utilized in the distillation of neural networks [21],
5Fig. 2. Softmax Function with Temperature
[22]. However, while the softmax function with temperature
has been used in model extraction attacks by Okada and
Hasegawa [2], the use of L2loss in model extraction attacks
is non-trivial. In this paper, we utilize L2loss in the model
extraction attacks for a regression task.
While an output of the softmax function with temperature is
distributed within [0,1] even for a corrupted prediction, a loss
function with the norm does not have any restriction in the
range of output. That is, a student model in distillation, i.e., a
substitute model for a model extraction attack, may be affected
greatly by a corrupted prediction from a teacher model, i.e., an
original model. To overcome the limitation described above,
instead of the use of outputs from the teacher model, we focus
on the method by Chen et al. [22] which utilizes the outputs
as an upper bound to be achieved for the student model. As
shown in equation (2), a penalty to adjust a parameter is given
for the output only when L2loss between a predicted value
Rt for the teacher model and labeled data y is smaller than
L2loss between a predicted value Rs for the student model
and y for the teacher model with respect to a parameter m
designated in advance. The function is called teacher bound
regression loss and is denoted by Lb. Here, m is a small value
estimated by distribution for each dataset.
Lb =
{
||Rs − y||
2
2, if ||Rs − y||
2
2 +m > ||Rt − y||
2
2
0, otherwise.
(2)
Furthermore, instead of the use of Lb as a loss function for the
student model, Lb is embedded in the use of smooth L1 loss,
Ls1, which is defined in equation (3). The smooth L1 loss Ls1
can overcome the problem where the derivation is impossible
by closing to zero on the L1 loss and the problem where a
gradient becomes too large in proportion to the distance on
L2. The distribution for each loss function is shown in Fig. 3.
Ls1 =
{
0.5|Rs − y|
2
1
, if |Rs − y|1 < 1
|Rs − y|1 − 0.5, otherwise.
(3)
Then, the loss function Lreg of a student model for a
regression task is defined as follows:
Lreg = Ls1(Rs, y) + vLb. (4)
For model extraction attacks, the teacher model described
above is dealt with by an original model stored in a public
Fig. 3. Graphs for Loss Functions
server while the student model is dealt with a substitute model.
In doing so, Lreg is utilized as a loss function to train the
substitute model. Since an adversary does not know the outputs
identical to the input data on typical neural networks, an output
returned from an original model is important information for
the adversary. Hence, discussion about the details in loss
functions described above is often unnecessary.
Meanwhile, in the case of RNNs, the following discussion is
necessary due to features of their input and output. For RNNs
with the many-to-many type, an adversary can correctly guess
the predicted data returned from an original model through its
own data because both input data and output data are included
in the same dataset as time-series data. In other words, an
adversary who owns a part of a dataset can train a substitute
model with its own input and labeled data. In doing so, to
give a more generalized performance to the substitute model,
knowledge of the original model trained with a larger amount
of data should be extracted by the adversary. We evaluate the
loss function Ls1 with respect to the extraction of knowledge
described above.
IV. EXPERIMENT
In this section, we conduct experiments on model extraction
attacks against the RNN described in the previous section
to evaluate their effectiveness in terms of the accuracy of
prediction in measuring the correctness of predictions on
the test distribution. In particular, we discuss neural network
architectures for both classification and regression tasks.
A. Experiment Setup
The experimental environment is shown in Table I. We
configured the environment on the Google Colaboratory5. The
training algorithm of neural networks used in the experiments
is the Adam optimizer, which is standard equipment for
TensorFlow6 with a learning rate of 0.001.
5https://colab.research.google.com
6https://www.tensorflow.org/
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EXPERIMENTAL ENVIRONMENT
Development Platform Tensor Flow 2.0.
OS Ubuntu 18.04
GPU NVIDIA Tesla K80 12GB
Memory 13GB RAM
Storage 360GB
Fig. 4. Example of MNIST Dataset
Fig. 5. Conversion of MNIST Dataset to Time-Series Data
1) Setting for the Classification Task: We utilize the
MNIST dataset7 in an experiment on model extraction attacks
against a many-to-many LSTM. The MNIST dataset used
consists of 55,000 samples as training data and 11,000 samples
as test data. Each sample represents a handwritten character
from 0 to 9 and is represented as 28×28 pixels. Fig. 48 shows
examples of the samples on the MNIST dataset.
In the experiment described below, each sample on the
MNIST dataset is converted into time-series data. As shown
in Fig. 5, each sample of 28× 28 pixels is divided into lines
for each time sequentially, where we suppose the t-th line is
input at time t. That is, there are 28 lines of input data, and
each line is given to a model as time-series data for times 1
to 28.
As neural networks for classification of handwritten dig-
its, DNNs and CNNs have been discussed by Okada and
Hasegawa with respect to model extraction attacks based on
the softmax function with temperature. To compare with the
work by Okada and Hasegawa, we adopt the same experi-
mental setting as in their work. In particular, 55,000 samples
as training data in the MNIST dataset are divided into five
subsets, i.e., 11,000 samples per subset. Let the subsets be
denoted as D1, D2, D3, D4, and D5 for convenience. Four
7http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist/
8https://machinelearningmastery.com/how-to-develop-a-convolutional-
neural-network-from-scratch-for-mnist-handwritten-digit-classification/
TABLE II
SETTING FOR TRAINING IN CASE OF CLASSIFICATION TASK
Epoch 220
Iterations in Each Epoch
|Da|
50
Batch Size 50
Fig. 6. Architecture of Neural Network Used on the Experiment for
Classification Task
of the subsets are utilized as training data Dc for an original
model, and the remaining subset is utilized as training data
Da for a substitute model by an adversary. Experiments are
conducted five times because there are five cases in which
each subset is used as Da, and then the final results of the
entire experiment are the averages of the results of the five
experiments, i.e., 5-fold cross validation.
Since the MNIST dataset is an academic benchmark for a
classification task, as described in Section III-B1, we utilize
cross-entropy error through the softmax function with temper-
ature as a loss function. Here, let temperatures be T = 1, 4, 16.
For T = 1, the softmax function with temperature is exactly
identical to the original softmax function as described above.
After training the substitute model with labeled data using the
cross-entropy error, the substitute model is trained as a loss
function utilizing the softmax function with temperature to
logits obtained from the original model.
The accuracy of prediction is evaluated with 10,000 samples
as test data of the MNIST dataset with respect to both the
original model of LSTM and the substitute model of RNN.
According to our pre-experiment, the accuracy of the original
model is 97.3% although we omit the details. The accuracy is
the attack goal of the substitute model for an adversary. The
setting for training in this experiment is shown in Table II.
Fig. 6 shows an architecture of the neural network used
on the experiment for classification task. The hidden layer is
RNNcell. The outputs of the RNNcell neurons at time t and the
inputs to the RNNcell neurons at time t+1 are connected by a
full connection, i.e., FC. We use tf.contrib.rnn.BasicLSTMCell
and tf.contrib.rnn.BasicRNNCell as a hidden layer of RNN
and LSTM, respectively, and use tf.contrib.rnn.static rnn for
network input/output.
7Fig. 7. Examples of the Air Quality dataset
TABLE III
COMBINATION OF TRAINING DATA OWNED BY ADVERSARY
Scale of Training Data Month of Training Data Used in Experiment
3 Months {4, 5, 6}, {7, 8, 9}, {10, 11, 12}
6 Months {4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}, {7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12}
2) Settings for Regression Task: For experiments on model
extraction attacks against the LSTM to solve the regression
task, we deal with an Air Quality dataset9, which consists
of the amount of materials contained in the atmosphere and
temperatures collected by sensor devices. The Air Quality
dataset was measured every hour from 18:00 on 03/10/2004
to 14:00 04/04/2005 and each record per hour consists of 13
kinds of values as the amount of materials and temperature.
Examples of the Air Quality dataset are shown in Fig. 710
A dataset that minimizes missing values is desirable because
we handle time-series data, ajd thus a reliable experimental
result can be expected by using the Air Quality dataset as
follows. We utilize six values, i.e., temperature T , absolute
humidity AH , time average value CO of oxide for carbon
monoxide, time average value NMHC of titanium oxide for
non-methane hydrocarbons, time average value NOx of tung-
sten oxide for nitrogen oxide, and time average value NO2 of
tungsten oxide for nitrogen dioxide. In this experiment, we let
an RNN receive the six values described above for 72 hours
as time-series data of input and then we predicted those values
as values measured on the 73rd hour as output.
We separated the Air Quality dataset for test data, i.e.,
data in 2005, and training data, i.e., data in 2004 data, as
a typical setting. Let Dc be the training data for an original
model, where an adversary has training data Da ∈ Dc on
some n months. Because there are multiple ways to select Da,
experiments are conducted according to Table III and then the
final result of the entire experiment is the average of results
on all the experiments.
As described above, the softmax function with temperature
cannot be used in the regression task. Therefore, the Lreg
9https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/air+quality
10https://www.atmarkit.co.jp/ait/articles/1804/26/news150.html
described in Section III-B2 is used instead. Note again that
Lreg is used in the distillation of neural networks as well as
the softmax function with temperature, and thus it is expected
to be effective in model extraction attacks. A substitute model
is trained 10,000 times using L2loss of the predicted values
and labeled data as Da, and then it is trained 10,000 times
again by using Lreg with the predicted values via querying to
the original model. The batch size is 16.
The coefficient R2 of determination, which is commonly
used for regression analysis, is utilized in the evaluation of
the accuracy. R2 is defined as follows:
R2 = 1−
∑n
i=1(yi − pre)
2∑n
i=1(yi − y)
2
, (5)
where y is the labeled data, y is the average of y, and pre
are the predictions from the original or substitute model.
Intuitively, R2 is desirably very close to 1. According to
Rubin [23], if R2 exceeds 0.8, the correlation is very strong
and, for example, R2 = 0.8 means that 80% of the variation
in the dependent variable has been explained. Based on our
pre-experiment, R2 of the original model is 0.8992 although
we omit the details. In this experiment, we refer to the value
of R2 as the accuracy, and an R2 of 0.8992 is the attack goal
of the substitute model for an adversary.
An architecture of the neural network used on this ex-
periment is almost the same as Fig. 6 except that a loss
function in the output layer and the number of neurons for
each layer and are different. In particular, the loss function
consists of the Lreg function as described above. Meanwhile,
the input layer and output layer contain six neurons and
the hidden layers contain twenty neurons, where the neu-
rons in each layers are fully connected in the same manner
as Fig. 6. Meanwhile, We use tf.nn.rnn cell.BasicRNNCell
and tf.nn.rnn cell.BasicLSTMCell as hidden layers and use
tf.nn.dynamic rnn for network input/output.
3) Evaluation Terms in Experiments: An evaluation of the
experiments is conducted as described below.
a) Classification Task: The evaluation terms in the ex-
periments for the classification task are as follows:
• Leaky time.
• Difference in accuracy depending on each architecture of
the substitute model.
• Difference in accuracy depending on the number of
training data owned by an adversary, i.e., Da.
• Difference in accuracy depending on temperature T of
the softmax function with temperature.
b) Regression Task: The evaluation terms in the experi-
ments for the regression task are as follows:
• Difference in R2 depending on each architecture of the
substitute model.
• Difference in R2 depending on the ratio of training data
owned by an adversary, i.e., Da.
• Effects of loss functions using Lb.
B. Experimental Result
1) Results of Classification Task: First, the results for
identification of leaky time are shown in Figs. 8 and 9.
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Fig. 9. Results for Identification of Leaky Time on RNN
Fig. 10. Intensive Extraction on Leaky Times
According to Fig. 8 and Fig. 9, increments of accuracy
for LSTM started from t = 21 and become more than 90%
after t = 26. On the other hand, in an additional experiment,
whereby RNN is utilized in the original model instead of
Fig. 11. Accuracy of Substitute Model Depending on the Number of Queries
LSTM, increments of accuracy for RNN started from t = 25
and become more than 90% after t = 27. Therefore, the
accuracy of the final results of LSTM is greater than that of
RNN, and LSTM is potentially leakier even at an early time.
Next, the results for intensive extraction of LSTM at t = 21
and later times are shown in Fig. 10. According to Fig. 10, a
model with 95% accuracy is extracted at t = 21. Notably, for
T = 16 in the softmax function with temperature, the accuracy
becomes 97.5%, which is higher than the 97.3% accuracy of
the original model. Note that, in the case in which the original
model is a many-to-one type of LSTM and only the final
prediction result at t = 27 is returned, an adversary will only
know the final result and cannot extract 97.5% accuracy for
the substitute model.
Finally, we investigate how the accuracy of the substitute
model is related to the number of queries at time t = 27 and
temperature T = 16. The result is shown in Fig. 11. As a
result, accuracy of the substitute model is rapidly downgraded
when the amount of training data Da owned by an adversary
decreases.
2) Results of the Regression Task: The results with the Air
Quality dataset are shown in Fig. 12. When the parameter m
exceeds 10, in Equation 2, ||Rs−y||
2
2 is selected as Lb almost
every time and m does not cause a change in the experimental
results, and thus we show results where m is 10 or less.
According to Fig. 12, in comparison with a substitute model
trained with only labeled data without querying to the original
model, a substitute model with the loss function Lreg, i.e.,
in equation (4), using the predicted values from the original
model provides a large value for R2. The results imply that
the parameter m becomes irrelevant when it is larger than
5. Besides, when an adversary has data for three months
from July to September, even the use of the loss function
is ineffective if training for the substitute model with labeled
data is unsuccessful. Moreover, R2 does not depend on m
when the model extraction attacks are performed with high
performance, e.g., R2 exceeds 0.85.
Next, we conduct an experiment where an adversary owns
an LSTM as a substitute model. The results are shown in
Fig. 13. According to Figs. 12 and 13, the effects of the
loss functions are independent of the use of LSTM and
RNN. Meanwhile, an adversary utilizing LSTM can extract
a substitute model with a higher accuracy because the use of
LSTM makes R2 larger. In comparison with the use of RNN
as a substitute model, the value of R2 is much lower for data
9Fig. 12. Accuracy of Substitute Model with Air Quality Dataset
Fig. 13. Accuracy in Air Quality Dataset When Adversary Owns LSTM
from the three months of April to June because parts of the Air
Quality dataset are unfit for LSTM. Similar to the results in the
previous paragraph, the use of the loss function is ineffective
if training for a substitute model is unsuccessful.
The overall results show that a substitute model with a high
accuracy can be extracted even when an adversary owns a
small amount of data and provides a number of queries, e.g.,
three months from October to December,.
V. CONSIDERATIONS
In this section, we discuss the differences in the behaviors
of model extraction attacks according to the distinction of
architecture in the classification problem to determine how
simple RNNs and complex LSTMs affect model extraction
attacks. Moreover, we consider the loss function used in the
regression problem to clarify how the designed loss function
works in the framework of model extraction attack, and then
show future prospects. Finally, we discuss countermeasures
against model extraction attacks.
A. Classification Problem
We discuss the impact of structural architectural differences
in the original model. LSTM can stochastically control in-
formation not only on a near past but also an earlier time
that can be fielded back, and thus a range of leaky times
can be potentially expanded. Likewise, a substitute model
with a high accuracy at t = 21 was extracted because the
bottom lines of the samples on the MNIST dataset contain
less information. Thus, the substitute model was able to learn
sufficient knowledge from the original model at the procedure
on the 21st line. In our experiment, we converted the MNIST
dataset to time-series data to identify the range of leaker times.
This implies the existence of other time-series datasets where
an adversary can extract a model even at earlier times, e.g., at
the beginning time of a model extraction attack. In such a case,
extraction becomes easier and thus more stringent restrictions
in the use of APIs are necessary.
Moreover, as an additional experiment, we used LSTM as
a substitute model. In comparison with the 90.3% accuracy
obtained by RNN as a substitute model with 1,375 training
data, the same accuracy is obtained by LSTM as a substitute
model with only 500 training data. Furthermore, in the case of
LSTM as a substitute model, the model with 99.69% accuracy
can be extracted when 11,000 training data is used in the
substitute model. Thus, in RNNs, an adversary using LSTM
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can extract a substitute model with a higher accuracy even
with fewer queries than the use of RNN.
Okada et al. [2] utilized DNN and CNN as substitute models
with the MNIST dataset, respectively, in their experiments.
In doing so, they showed that models with more than 90%
accuracies can be extracted even with 684 training data on
DNN and 171 training data on CNN for the substitute models.
In other words, according to Okada et al., the use of CNN is
more effective for an adversary to extract a model with a high
accuracy in an image classification task. Likewise, Krishna et
al. [11] showed that an adversary can obtain a higher accuracy
when a more complicated architecture of BERT [12] is used.
In contrast, we show that in the case of time-series data, the
use of LSTM as a substitute model enables an adversary to
extract a model with a higher accuracy even with fewer queries
than the use of a RNN. Our results are identical to those of
Okada et al. and Krishna et al., except for differences in the
architectures among RNN, CNN, and BERT.
Finally, although a substitute model in our experiment was
trained by utilizing labeled data and soft labels separately,
Chen et al. [22] defined a loss function using both at the same
time. The use of this loss function can reduce the number of
epochs in training. In particular, the loss function is defined
in quation (6) below, where Ps is the predicted value of a
substitute model, Pt is a predicted value of an original model,
µ is a hyperparameter, Lhard is the value of a loss function
obtained by labeled data, and Lsoft is the value of a loss
function obtained by soft labels.
L = µLhard(Ps, y) + (1− µ)Lsoft(Ps, Pt). (6)
The convergence of a substitute model with high accuracy
becomes more effective by setting an appropriate value for µ.
We leave the determination of an appropriate value for µ as
an open problem.
B. Regression Task
We consider the loss function Lb. We discuss the reason
why performance of a substitute model is independent of a
parameter m when the model extraction attacks are performed
with high performance, e.g., R2 exceeds 0.85. The parameter
m affects the case where a non-zero value is selected for
Lb, i.e., frequency of training such that weights are signifi-
cantly updated. Since training for the substitute model by an
adversary was sufficiently converged in our experiment given
a sufficient number of epochs, the case described above did
not become a problem.
Next, we consider the reason why the loss function Lreg
defined in equation (4) is ineffective in the case where training
for the substitute model with labeled data is unsuccessful. In
that case, at the phase of training with the predict values from
an original model, a value of Rs is expected to be close
enough to that of Rt. Consequently, if Rs is mismatched
and underfitting at the phase of Lb in equation (2), the
inequality cannot be evaluated as expected. Thus, its resulting
loss function Lreg will become unworkable.
Finally, if an adversary who owns data from April to June
can produce valid data from July to September, then it has the
same ability as an adversary who originally owns data from
April to September. This is possible for at least time-series
data such as the Air Quality dataset, in which an output value
at a certain time is identical to an input at a later time. For
instance, if an adversary who owns data from April to June
makes queries from 0:00 on June 28th to 23:00 on June 30th,
then it may be able to precisely predict data about 0:00 on
July 1st, which is unknown for the adversary. By iterating
such an operation recursively, the adversary can obtain a
larger and pseudo dataset. We plan to verify the validity of
the methodology in a future work by utilizing features of
input/output for RNNs to handle time-series data.
C. Countermeasures
As countermeasures to model extraction attacks, Kesarwani
et al. [5] proposed extraction warning, wherein a model trained
by an adversary is emulated as another model by a proxy
and extraction will be alerted if the emulated model achieves
some threshold designated in advance. Although the extraction
warning can potentially be useful, settings about thresholds
have never been discussed. In addition, although there is a
method to detect model extraction attacks [3] whereby a cloud
sever checks if the distribution of API queries deviates from
general and honest users, such an approach is ineffective
against collusion between adversaries who execute the attacks
according to Kesarwani et al. [5]. Moreover, according to Atli
et al. [14], approaches to monitoring and alerting behavior
of users are ineffective against model extraction attacks on
complex neural networks.
Szyller et al. [24] proposed an approach based on digital wa-
termarking [25], [26] to claim cloud’s ownership after a model
extraction attack is made. Such an approach is expected to
detect model extraction attacks by verifying the watermarking
in a substitute model when an adversary publishes the model.
However, the model extraction attacks based on distillation
shown in this work (and the work of Okada et al. [2]) enable
an adversary to remove watermarking. Moreover, according
to Krishna et al. [11], watermarking can only verify whether
an original model has been stolen through a substitute model
and not prevent the extraction itself. Therefore, extraction can
go unnoticed if an adversary keeps its own substitute model
private, making the use of digital watermarking insufficient.
Another countermeasure is the use of differential pri-
vacy [27] as proposed by Huadi et al. [28]. However, such an
approach will downgrade performance of an original model
hosted by a cloud server. Consequently, to the best of our
knowledge, a proposal of practical and effective countermea-
sures remains an open problem.
Finally, we discuss an alternative way to mitigate model
extraction attacks, especially against the attacks discussed in
this paper. The use of the softmax function with tempera-
ture [9] was the key idea regardless of the architecture from
the viewpoint of model extraction attacks for a classification
task. In doing so, logit provides the probability for each label
as a predicted result and is given to the softmax function
with temperature as input. Since the accuracy heavily depends
on the maximized value in the prediction result, we consider
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manipulating the effects by the second maximized value
and the lower values to mitigate the softmax function with
temperature. Intuitively, this can prevent an adversary from
obtaining more information than prediction results alone by
disturbing an output without affecting a precisely predicted
result.
VI. CONCLUSION
Model extraction attacks enable an adversary to extract a
machine learning model via prediction queries to a model. In
this paper, we discussed model extraction attacks based on
features of recurrent neural networks (RNNs). In a case of a
classification task, we extracted a substitute model without the
final output from a original model by utilizing outputs halfway
through the sequence. In a case of a regression task, we
presented a new attack by newly configuring a loss function.
In a classification task, we conducted experiments by con-
verting the MNIST dataset to time-series data. Our experi-
mental results show that a substitute model can be effectively
extracted by utilizing prediction results from the original
model after identifying a leaky time via training with true
labels. In particular, by utilizing the softmax function with
temperature [9] in predicted results from the original model,
a substitute model with a higher prediction accuracy than the
original model could be extracted.
In a regression task, we proposed a new extension of model
extraction attacks by using a teacher bounded regression loss
function [22] as a loss function. In experiments with the Air
Quality dataset for the proposed attack, we showed a substitute
model whose correlation is strongly similar to an original
model even when the substitute model was trained with only
a small amount of data.
We also considered relationships between the accuracy and
complicated architectures for a substitute model. We conclude
that the use of a complex architecture contributes to obtaining
a higher accuracy for a substitute model. These results corrob-
orate the findings of Okada and Hasegawa [2] and Krishna et
al. [11].
We plan to extract a model with a higher accuracy in a
regression task by generating new data from time-series data
owned by an adversary in a future work. We also plan to
discuss the threshold of restrictions in the use of APIs as a
countermeasure to model extraction attacks.
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